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Abstract
In this paper we adopt the Selten–Pool [Selten, R., Pool, J., 1991. The distribution of foreign language
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to communicate with other speakers of an acquired language, and “learning costs” incurred by acquiring
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1. Introduction
The reasons that induce inhabitants of a country to learn other languages can be analyzed by
examining the benefits and the costs that learning generates. The benefits of acquiring an addi-
tional language are often linked with the increased earning potential,3 especially in the case of
immigrants who acquire the native language of the country in which they live. A different approach
has been pioneered by Selten and Pool (1991) who introduce a general model of language acqui-
sition that does not limit the analysis to “earnings as a mechanism and to firms as a milieu of the
incentive to learn languages” (Selten and Pool, p. 66). In their model every individual derives a
gross benefit from the knowledge of a foreign language and incurs a cost of learning it. The “gross
communicative benefit” is positively correlated with the number of other individuals with whom
an individual can communicate by sharing at least one common language. Naturally all languages
are assumed to be “communicative substitutes,” and communication between two individuals can
take place in any common language they share. Selten and Pool show that an equilibrium of the
multi-country multi-lingual language acquisition model exists. The characterization of an equi-
librium is studied by Church and King (1993). They examine “corner” equilibria in a bilingual
setting with two populations, i and j, where all citizens of one population, say i, learn the language
of j, whereas no citizen in population j learns the language of i. Gabszewicz et al. (2005) examine
the case of linear communicative benefit functions that do not distinguish between communication
in the native and the non-native language. Assuming that learning costs are individual-
dependent, their paper provides a characterization of linguistic equilibria that include interior
equilibria.
The focus of our paper is two-fold. One is a characterization of a linguistic equilibrium in a
non-linear setting and the second is the estimation of demand functions for languages. We consider
a variant of the Selten–Pool model with two populations i and j. Each population speaks its native
language and may learn the other one. If the population that speaks i is large relative to the other
one, the incentive of an i-citizen to learn the other language is likely to be quite low since she
can trade and communicate with enough citizens in her own country, but a large population that
speaks j may also attract citizens who speak i.4 The substitution between the languages, however,
is imperfect, and we assume that the benefits of communication are larger when the languages are
native for both sides. We also assume that the benefits of learning the other language are positively
correlated with its linguistic proximity to the individual’s native language. Indeed, for a native
speaker of Portuguese the benefits of learning Spanish is quite limited given the fact a native
Portuguese can understand some Spanish without actually learning it. Thus, for any individual
t we represent the gross communication benefit by means of an increasing function with three
arguments: the number of individuals who share a common native language with t, those who
speak a language known by t but do not share her native language, and the linguistic proximity
between the two languages. We assume that the benefit functions are supermodular in the first two
variables. This condition implies that an increase in the size of one of the populations raises the
marginal communicative benefit of members of the other population to learn the foreign language.
We also show that supermodularity is indispensable for our results to hold. Finally, we impose
cross-country “learning cost heterogeneity”: the difficulty, and thus the cost, of learning a new
3 See e.g., MacManus et al. (1978), Grenier (1985), Lang (1986), and Chiswick (1998).
4 See Lazear (1999, p. 124). who points out that “the incentives are greater for any individual to learn the majority
language when only a few persons in the country speak his or her native language”.
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language depends on its linguistic proximity with the individual’s native language, as a native
speaker of Portuguese would find it easier to learn Spanish than Swedish. The fact that learning
a foreign language is easier if it is close will have an impact on the number of those who learn it.
The net communicative benefit that determines the individuals’ behavior is the difference between
the gross communicative benefit and the cost of acquiring a new language.
The paper is organized as follows. The intuition on the expected properties of demand functions
for foreign languages is confirmed by the theoretical model in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
data that will be used to estimate such demand functions, while results are reported in Section 4.
Section 5 is devoted to some concluding remarks.
2. Modelling the learning of a foreign language
Though one can examine a multi-lingual environment, the main features of the model can
be captured in a two-language framework. As indicated in Section 1, we adopt the Selten–Pool
paradigm of communicative benefits and assume that the utility of each individual t is determined
by the number of individuals she can communicate with. The quality of t’s communication in a
given language depends on whether the language is native or not. Her utility is therefore repre-
sented by the benefit function Ut(x, y, l), where x is the (log of the) number of individuals who
speak the same native language as t, y the (log of the) number of individuals who share with t a
language that is not her native language, and l is the (log of the) linguistic distance between the two
languages.5 For simplicity, we assume that the benefit functions are common to all individuals,
so that Ut(x, y, l) = U(x, y, l).
To make our framework more concrete, we consider two countries, i and j, with Ni and Nj
citizens, respectively. Citizens speak their own native language, denoted by i and j as well, and,
for simplicity, we assume that all citizens are originally unilingual, but may consider learning the
other language. We denote by Nij (respectively Nji) the number of citizens of country i (country
j) who study language j (i).
More specifically, the communicative benefit of an i-speaker who learns j (and, thus, is able to
communicate with all j-speakers) is given by a continuously differentiable and increasing function
U(ni, nj, lij). (Here n represents the logarithm of the corresponding value of N and lij = lji is the
(log of the) linguistic distance Lij between languages i and j.) The benefit of an i-speaker who does
not learn language j is U(ni, nji, lij): she will communicate with those who know her language in
country j. For j-speakers the levels of communicative benefit are U(nj, ni, lji) and U(nj, nij, lji),
respectively. An individual in country i who learns language j incurs a cost C(lij), determined
by the linguistic proximity between the two languages, where the function C is continuously
differentiable and increasing. We impose the following additional assumptions.
Assumption 1. For every l > 0, the function U(·, ·, l) is supermodular; that is, for every two pairs
of positive numbers n¯i, ni, n¯j, nj with n¯i > ni, n¯j > nj , and every l > 0 the following inequality
holds:
U(n¯i, n¯j, l) − U(n¯i, nj, l) ≥ U(ni, n¯j, l) − U(ni, nj, l).
The supermodularity of U implies that an increase in the population of one country raises
the marginal communicative benefit of citizens of the other to learn the foreign language. If the
5 Logarithms are used to link the model to the empirical results. This entails no loss of generality.
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function U is twice continuously differentiable in its two first variables, this condition amounts
to the positivity of the cross-derivative Uij (see Topkis, 1979).
We assume that communicative benefits are sufficiently high relatively to learning costs by
requiring that if no j-speaker learns i, an i-speaker would get a positive net benefit from learning j.
That is, her access to all j-speakers outweighs the language learning cost C(lij). If this assumption
is violated, then no citizen of country i learns the foreign language. Similarly, it is worthwhile for
a j-speaker to study i if no i-speaker learns j. This very mild condition is stated as follows.
Assumption 2.
U(ni, nj, lij) − U(ni, 0, lij) > C(lij) and U(nj, ni, lij) − U(nj, 0, lij) > C(lij).
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a unique interior linguistic equilibrium
where all individuals are indifferent between learning the foreign language and incurring the
cost of learning it and not learning the language.6 This equilibrium is a solution of the following
system of two equations:
U(ni, nj, lij) − C(lij) − U(ni, nji, lij) = 0, (1)
U(nj, ni, lij) − C(lij) − U(nj, nij, lij) = 0. (2)
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Indeed, Assumption 2 together with the continuity of U in
the second argument yields the unique nji that satisfies (1), whereas Assumption 2 together with
the continuity of U in the first argument guarantees the uniqueness of nij that satisfies (2). 
The interior linguistic equilibrium yields functions nij(ni, nj, lij) and nji(nj, ni, lij), that iden-
tify the number of learners of the foreign language in countries i and j, respectively. Denote
by log(Nij/Ni) = Di(ni, nj, lij), the equilibrium share (demand function) of individuals whose
native language is i and who learn language j. The properties of Di are described in the following
proposition.7 It states that the propensity of an individual to learn another language declines with
the size of her own population, but increases with the size of the population of the other country. It
is important to point out that the last conclusion hinges upon the supermodularity of the commu-
nicative benefit function. Finally, we show that the desire to learn the other language is negatively
correlated with the cost of learning when the latter is increasing in the linguistic distance between
the two languages.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then,
(a) If U is concave in the second variable, Di(·, nj, lij) is decreasing in ni.
(b) Di(ni, ·, lij) is increasing in nj .
Proof.
(a) We can rewrite Eq. (2) as
U(nj, ni, lij) − U(nj,Di(ni, nj, lij)) − C(lij) = 0. (3)
6 There could also be “corner” equilibria, which are not examined here.
7 Obviously, the same properties hold for Dj .
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Consider two values, n¯i > ni. Concavity of U in the second variable implies that
U(nj, n¯i, lij) − U(nj,Di(ni, nj, lij)) − C(lij) < 0.
Since
U(nj, n¯i, lij, ) − U(nj,Di(n¯i, nj, lij)) − C(lij) = 0,
the monotonicity of U implies
Di(n¯i, nj, lij) < Di(ni, nj, lij).
(b) Consider (3) and let n¯j > nj . Assumption 1 implies that
U(n¯j, ni, lij) − U(n¯j,Di(ni, nj, lij), lij) − C(lij) > 0,
but since
U(n¯j, ni, lij) − U(n¯j,Di(ni, n¯j, lij), lij) − C(lij) = 0,
the monotonicity of U yields
Di(ni, nj, lij) < Di(ni, n¯j, lij). 
It is worth pointing out that assertion (b) of Proposition 2 does not necessarily hold if the
benefit function is not supermodular. Indeed, consider the example where the benefit function
U(x, y, l) is given by log(x + y) + log c, where c = eC(lij). Then Eq. (2) turns into
log(nj + ni) − log(nj + nij) = log c.
Thus,
nj + ni
nj + nij = c and nij =
ni
c
+ (1 − c)nj
c
.
However, since log c > 0 and c > 1, it follows that the number of learners of language j in
country i declines in the population size of country j.
Our last proposition claims that a larger linguistic distance between the languages may reduce
the number of those who learn foreign languages. In order to prove this assertion we assume that
the marginal communicative benefit with respect to linguistic distance declines with the number
of learners of one’s own language in the other country.
Assumption 3. The function ∂U(n, ·, l)/∂l is decreasing for every n, l > 0.
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1–3, the demand function Di(ni, nj, ·) is decreasing in lij .
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Table 1
Main languages used in the European Union (millions)
Native speakers in the EUa Mother tongueb Woldwide usec
English 62 3 341 1800
French 64 5 77 169
German 90 1 100 126
Spanish 39.4 340 450
Italian 57.6 62 63
Dutch 21 9 20 20
a English is the native language in Great Britain and Ireland. French is the native language in France and is spoken by 40
percent of Belgians. German is the native language in Germany and Austria. Spanish and Italian are the native languages
in Spain and Italy, respectively. Finally, Dutch is the native language in the Netherlands and is spoken by 60 percent of
Belgians. Note that for Dutch there is a discrepancy between speakers in the EU and the estimates in columns (2) and (3).
b Number of first language speakers as given by http://www.ethnologue.com. For Spanish, the number is the average
between the two estimates by http://www.ethnologue.com.
c Dalby (2002, p. 31) for English and Spanish. The French diplomatic service
(http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/francophonie/francais/carte.html) provides the estimation of 169 million people
who use French. For Italian and Dutch, see Crystal (2001).
Proof. Consider Eq. (3) and two values, ¯lij > lij . Since C′(·) is positive, Assumption 3 implies
that
∂U(nj, ni, lij)
∂l
− ∂U(nj,Di(ni, nj, lij), lij)
∂l
− C′(lij) < 0
and
U(nj, ni, ¯lij, ) − U(nj,Di(ni, nj, lij), ¯lij) − C(¯lij) < 0.
Then the monotonicity of U in the second argument implies that
Di(ni, nj, ¯lij) < Di(ni, nj, lij).
That is, the number of j-learners in country i declines if the linguistic distance is larger. 
3. Data
We estimate the demand functions derived in Section 2 for English, French, German and
Spanish by citizens from the European Union (EU) whose native languages are none of these.
The data consist of knowledge of native and foreign languages in various EU countries and
distances between languages.
Language proficiency was the topic of a survey on languages ordered by the Directorate of
Education and Culture of the EU in 2000.8 In each of the 15 then EU members, 1000 interviews
(with some minor variations) were conducted on the use of languages. Table 1 gives a general
overview of the six languages most extensively used by native speakers in the EU15. It also shows
to what extent each language is spoken elsewhere than in its country of “origin.” Column (1)
shows the number of native speakers, in fact the population in each country.9 Column (2) displays
estimates of the worldwide use of each language as mother tongue. The last column gives estimates
8 INRA (2001).
9 To simplify, we assume that immigrants speak the language of the country to which they migrated.
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Table 2
Knowledge of languages in the European Union (millions and percent)
Country (1) Native language known
by (millions) (2)
Percentage who know
English (3) French (4) German (5) Spanish (6)
Austria (G) 100.0 46 11 100 1
Denmark (Dk) 5.3 75 5 37 1
Finland (Fi) 6.0 61 1 7 1
France (F) 77.0 42 100 8 15
Germany (G) 100.0 54 16 100 2
Greece (Gr) 12.0 47 12 12 5
Italy (I) 62.0 39 29 4 3
Ireland (E) 341.0 100 23 6 2
The Netherlands (D) 20.0 70 19 59 1
Portugal (P) 176.0 35 28 2 4
Spain (S) 340.0 36 19 2 100
Sweden (Sw) 9.0 79 7 31 4
United Kingdom (E) 341.0 100 22 9 5
The native language in each country is given between parentheses (G, German; Dk, Danish; Fi, Finnish; F, French; G,
German; Gr, Greek; I, Italian; E, English; D, Dutch; P, Portuguese; S, Spanish; Sw, Swedish). The numbers in the first
column are from http://www.ethnologue.com. The percentages of people who know English, French, German and Spanish
in each country are from Ginsburgh and Weber (2005).
of worldwide knowledge as mother tongue and otherwise. English, French and German are the
languages most widely spoken in the EU. Though Italy has a larger population than Spain, and
the number of native speakers of Italian is larger, the language is hardly spoken outside of Italy,10
which is less so for Spanish. Dutch is spoken only in the Netherlands and Belgium. Therefore,
in Table 2 we restrict our attention to the “knowledge” of four non-native languages (English,
French, German, and Spanish) in 13 members of EU15 that have a dominant language.11 Column
(2) contains the world population that speaks the language of the country listed in column (1) as
first language.12 The other four columns give for each EU country the share of the total population
that (claims to) know English, French, German and Spanish. Table 3 displays distances between
languages derived by Dyen et al. (1992).13
4. Estimation results
The general idea is to estimate the following demand function for languages j (j = English,
French, German, Spanish) by those whose native language is i (i = Austria, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom):
log
(
Nij
Ni
)
EU
= α0 + α1ni + α2nj + α3lij + uij, (4)
10 Italian is known by 9 percent of the population in Austria, 6 percent in Belgium and Greece, 5 percent in France, and
1 percent in other countries of the EU.
11 Belgium and Luxembourg are excluded with no major impact on our results.
12 Following http://www.ethnologue.com.
13 See also Ginsburgh et al. (2005) where these distances are used to compute optimal sets of languages in the EU before
the last two enlargements.
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Table 3
Distances between languages (1000 ×)
English French German Spanish
Danish 407 759 293 750
Dutch 392 756 162 742
English 0 764 422 760
Finnish 1000 1000 1000 1000
French 764 0 756 266
German 422 764 0 747
Greek 838 843 812 833
Italian 753 197 735 212
Portuguese 760 291 753 126
Spanish 760 266 747 0
Swedish 411 756 305 747
Source: Dyen et al. (1992) for further details. See also Ginsburgh et al. (2005).
where (Nij/Ni)EU represents the proportion of inhabitants of EU country i who are proficient in
language j (columns (3)–(6) in Table 2); ni and nj represent respectively the (log of the) world
populations whose native languages are i and j (column (2) in Table 2) and lij is the (log of the)
distance between languages i and j (Table 3). Proposition 2 suggests that the signs of coefficients
should be α1 < 0, α2 > 0. The sign of α3 results from two opposite effects, a positive one through
the utility function (a distant language is more interesting and beneficial to learn), and a negative
one due to the cost of learning a new language, which is higher if the distance is larger. The
two effects cannot be identified separately, and only the net effect can be estimated. Proposition 3
indicates that under reasonable conditions the cost effect outweighs the benefit advantage, yielding
α3 < 0.
We first estimate a demand function for each foreign language j separately:
log
(
Nij
Ni
)
EU
= α0nj + α1ni + α3lij + uij.
Note that in each case, the intercept α0 is multiplied by the world population that practices
language j and can be interpreted as α2. This normalization (which has no consequence on other
coefficients) will make it possible to give a first insight into the attraction power of individual
foreign languages. Estimation results are reproduced in Table 4. They show that the fit is excel-
lent and consistent with theory for English and German. This is not the case for French and
Spanish, though distance always picks a negative sign. The coefficient for the country of ori-
gin, which should also be negative, is so for English and German only. Finally, observe that the
(population-weighted) intercept terms are all positive, but their magnitudes differ widely, giving
a first (expected) indication that the four languages exercise different attraction powers.14
The number of observations for single languages is rather small (11 or 12), and pooling makes
it possible to estimate the basic equation using more observations. Pooling also checks whether
the relations that govern the learning of a foreign language hold more generally than for each
language individually.
Estimation of Eq. (4) on the full set of 46 observations leads to poor results that are not reported.
The results given in the last column of Table 4 are for an equation that has the same form, except
14 We also computed such equations using native populations in each country instead of the number of speakers of each
language given in column (2) of Table 2. The results are qualitatively similar.
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Table 4
Estimation results
English French German Spanish All four Trade shares
Population speaking
language i (α1)
−0.153∗(0.021) 0 355∗(0.138) −0.361∗(0.072) 0.032(0.168) −0.058(0.069) −0.055(0.070)
Population speaking
language j (α2)
0.625∗(0.057) 0.600∗(0.067)
Distance between
languages i and j (α3)
−0.408∗(0.082) −0 512(0.416) −1.362∗(0.214) −0.560(0.385) −0.954∗(0.200) −0.789∗(0.205)
Intercept (α0) 0.733∗(0.016) 0 193(0.121) 0.586∗(0.077) 0.091(0.109) 0.080(0.100) 0.070(0.096)
French speaking
population (α0F)
−0.112(0.062)
German speaking
population (α0G)
−0.233∗(0.061)
Spanish speaking
population (α0S)
−0.514∗(0.050) −0.340∗(0.044)
Trade share 0.249(0.134)
R2 0.919 0 599 0.910 0.232 0.758 0.712
No. of observations 11 12 11 12 46 46
Standard errors are given between brackets, next to the coefficients. Starred coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent (or 1 percent) probability level. The
number of observations is equal to 12 for France and Spain, since French and Spanish is a foreign language in 12 of the 13 countries. This number is 11 for English (spoken in
the UK and Ireland) and German (spoken in Germany and Austria).
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that it contains an α0jδjnj term for each language j = French, German and Spanish, where δj
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for a language j that is acquired, and 0 otherwise. As can be
checked, the α0j parameters take significantly different values and explain why the fit of the
general equation is poor. The results are consistent with the theoretical model (α1 is negative, but
fails to be significantly different from 0 at the usual 5 percent level), but the four languages have
different attraction powers. The coefficients can be considered to be elasticities. The “distance
elasticity” is not significantly different from −1, implying that a 1 percent increase in the distance
between two languages decreases the number of its learners by 1 percent. This is far from being
negligible. The “origin elasticity” is small (5 percent), but the “destination elasticity” is large for
English and French (63 and 52 percent), somewhat smaller for German and Spanish.
The last equation shows the effect of trade shares15 (which do not appear in the theoretical
model) as possible determinants (or incentives) to learn foreign languages. The parameter picked
by the trade shares variable is almost significant at the 5 percent probability level, but hardly
changes the values of the other parameters, though now English, French and German benefit from
similar attraction power (the null hypothesis that they are equal cannot be rejected).
5. Concluding comments
Our results show that, in conformity with the theoretical model, three variables explain rea-
sonably well the share of people who learn a foreign language, without taking into account the
incentives every individual has to acquire a language. The larger the native population that speaks
the language, the fewer speakers are prone to learn another language; the more the foreign lan-
guage is spoken, the more it attracts others to learn it; and the larger the distance between two
languages, the smaller the proportion of people who will learn it. However, our results also show
that the attraction powers of the four foreign languages are significantly different, and that other
determinants, mostly historical, must be at play. Spanish, for instance, should attract Europeans
much more than it currently does. With the exception of France, there is no country in which
more than 5 percent of the population knows the language. The isolation of Spain until 1975 is
a partial explanation of this phenomenon, but the large population of native Spanish speakers in
Mexico and South America, and increasingly in the United States, does not seem to generate large
incentives to learn the tongue. France, on the other hand, is quite restrictive on the use of foreign
languages in the public domain. For instance, it issued regulations that make it difficult for certain
categories of civil servants to use languages other than French in national and even international
meetings.
Dynamics, past and current cultural relations, common borders (Germany and the Netherlands),
non-centrality of a country (Spain, and to some extent, France) can be represented by the trade
shares. This does not improve the estimation results in any major way. Therefore our model
provides only partial answers to the questions of why English is becoming the lingua franca in
Europe (and probably in the world), and Spanish is relatively less spoken in Europe.
References
Chiswick, B R., 1998. Hebrew language usage: determinants and effects on earnings among immigrants in Israel. Journal
of Population Economics 11, 253–271.
15 Value of exports and imports of country i from and to English, French, German or Spanish speaking countries.
10
Church, J., King, I., 1993. Bilingualism and network externalities. Canadian Journal of Economics 26, 337–345.
Crystal, D., 2001. A Dictionary of Language. Chicago University Press, Chicago.
Dalby, A., 2002. Languages in Danger. Allen Lane-The Penguin Press, London.
Dyen, I., Kruskal, J.B., Black, P., 1992. An Indo-European classification: a lexicostatistical experiment. Transactions of
the American Philosophical Society 82 (part 5).
Gabszewicz, J., Ginsburgh, V., Weber, S., 2005. Bilingualism and Communicative Benefits. Mimeo.
Ginsburgh, V., Ortun˜o-Ortı´n, I., Weber, S., 2005. Language disenfranchisement in linguistically diverse societies. The
case of the European Union. Journal of the European Economic Association 3, 946–965.
Ginsburgh, V., Weber, S., 2005. Language disenfranchisement in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies
43, 273–286.
Grenier, G., 1985. Bilinguisme, transferts linguistiques et revenus du travail au Que´bec, quelques e´le´ments d’interaction.
In: Vaillancourt, F. (Ed.), Economie et Langue. Editeur officiel, Que´bec, pp. 243–287.
INRA, 2001. Eurobarome`tre 54 Special, Les Europe´ens et les Langues.
Lang, K., 1986. A language theory of discrimination. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 363–381.
Lazear, E., 1999. Culture and language. Journal of Political Economy 107, S95–S126.
MacManus, W., Gould, W., Welsch, F., 1978. Earnings of Hispanic men: the role of English language proficiency. Journal
of Labor Economics 1, 101–130.
Selten, R., Pool, J., 1991. The distribution of foreign language skills as a game equilibrium. In: Selten, R. (Ed.), Game
Equilibrium Models, vol. 4. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 64–84.
Topkis, D., 1979. Equilibrium points in non-zero sum n-person submodular games. SIAM Journal of Control and
Optimization 17, 773–787.
11
